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Abstract 
Hunting is an activity that appears to provoke – often immediate and strongly pronounced – 
moral assessments, i.e., judgments of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. A large body of literature 
explores these moral arguments, often from a philosophical or normative perspective, 
focusing on specific types of hunting. However, studies that ground such explorations in 
empirical, systematically analysed, yet contextualised data seem to be missing. We argue that 
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such an approach is essential to understand conflicts over hunting and wildlife management, 
and present data from focus group discussions and interviews with hunters, non-hunters and 
hunting critics across six countries in Europe and eastern Africa.  
Our findings suggest that moral arguments play an extremely important role in the 
legitimation and delegitimation of hunting practices through discourse. In particular, study 
participants referred to the motives of hunters as a factor that, in their eyes, determined the 
acceptability of hunting practices. Moral argumentations exhibited patterns that were 
common across study sites, such as a perceived moral superiority of the ‘moderate’ and 
‘measured’, and a lack of legitimacy of the ‘excessive’. Implicit orders of hunting motives 
were used to legitimise types of hunting that were suspected to be contested. 
On the basis of these findings, we discuss how the moral elements of hunting discourses 
relate to broader discourses on environmental management, and how these are used to 
establish (or dispute) the legitimacy of hunting . Our analysis also suggests that there might 
be more overlap between moral arguments of hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics than 
popularly assumed, which, where required, could be used as a starting point for conflict 
management. 
 
Key words: conservation, discourse analysis, hunting, legitimacy, morality, moral geography, 
normativity, wildlife  
 
1 Introduction 
1.1 The morality of hunting 
Hunting is an activity that appears to provoke – often immediate and strongly pronounced – 
moral assessments, i.e., judgments of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and such 
moral arguments are often powerful ingredients in disputes over hunting and wildlife 
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management, whether in political, public or academic realms. Numerous philosophical 
articles explicitly address the morality of hunting (List 1997, Veatch Moriarty and Woods 
1997, Peterson 2004, Bergman 2005, Cahoone 2009, Vitali 2010). Some of these focus on a 
specific approach to hunting, often taking a normative perspective in defence of a certain 
hunting type, such as trophy or sport hunting (Curnutt 1996, Gunn 2001, Van de Pitte 2003, 
List 2004, Dickson 2009, Kretz 2010). Other, often historical analyses address morality 
questions in a more implicit fashion (MacKenzie 1987, Steinhart 1989, Adams 2009). 
However, only a handful of empirical – e.g., psychological, sociological or anthropological – 
studies exist that elucidate contemporary understandings of the legitimacy and morality of 
hunting. 
Among these, Dahles (1993) and Marvin (2000) present hunters’ views and argumentation 
related to the legitimacy of their practices as part of their anthropological analyses of hunting 
in the Netherlands and England, respectively. And, based on a wide variety of textual data, 
Minnis (1996) develops a “comprehensive and exhaustive” (ibd. p. 349) list of arguments 
raised against hunting, and contends that debates over hunting should not be simplified as a 
dispute between hunters and ‘anti-hunters’, as acceptability of hunting is context-specific, 
dependent on hunting methods, motives, the species hunted, places and participants. 
Heberlein and Willebrand (1998) replicate Kellert’s (1979) survey and canvass attitudes of 
the general public in the USA and Sweden towards three types of hunting, namely (a) 
traditional native subsistence hunting, (b) hunting for meat and recreation and (c) hunting for 
sport and recreation. Compared to Kellert’s findings 20 years earlier, attitudes had not 
significantly changed: Native subsistence hunting was supported by a large majority in both 
countries, followed by hunting for meat and recreation, whereas majorities in both countries 
were opposed to hunting for sport and recreation. While Heberlein and Willebrand’s (1998) 
findings underscore Minnis’ (1996) statement that views on the legitimacy of hunting tend to 
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differentiate between different types of hunting (rather than to support or condemn all 
hunting per se) and that perceptions of hunting motives play an important role in shaping 
these views, their study also highlights the limitations of very concise questionnaire items in 
eliciting people’s perceptions of and attitudes towards moral aspects of hunting. For example, 
their findings provide little insight into the question how their respondents disentangled 
complex notions like “traditional native subsistence hunting” or “hunting for recreation and 
meat”.  However, in-depth qualitative research that includes the views of both hunting and 
non-hunting individuals and groups on moral issues related to a range of types of hunting 
seems to be missing. As such insights are essential to understand conflicts over hunting and 
wildlife management, our study sets out to address this gap.  
 
1.2 The moralities of land management 
Previous research has explored the moralities associated to land management, such as 
farming, in the context of moral geographies, i.e., the question how “assumptions about the 
relationship between people and their environments may reflect and produce moral 
judgements, and how the conduct of particular groups or individuals in particular spaces may 
be judged appropriate or inappropriate” (Matless 2000, p. 522). While moral arguments have 
to be understood in relation to their histories and geographies (Setten 2004), the appreciation 
of their contextuality does not preclude us from investigating similarities and patterns of 
moralities across contexts (Smith 2000). The four ‘axes’ of moral arguments identified by 
Brown (2007a, b) in her study on crofting (i.e., small-scale agriculture including the 
management of common property) in northwest Scotland could potentially provide a 
framework to organise enquiry into such patterns, also in relation to land management issues 
other than crofting: Brown (2007a, b) distinguishes between (i) identity-based (who counts as 
a proper crofter?), (ii) practice-based (what counts as proper crofting?), (iii) objective-based 
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(what purposes ought crofting to serve?) and (iv) place-based (where is crofting seen as 
appropriate?) arguments. These four axes resonate with the types of arguments that Minnis 
(1996, see above) mentions in passing as underpinning the acceptance of hunting in the U.S.  
 
1.3 Morality, legitimacy and discourse – the present study 
Our study aims to provide a better understanding of what is seen as morally acceptable 
hunting across a wide range of cultural and environmental contexts. In this sense, it provides 
insights into the ‘moral geographies’ (Section 1.2) of hunting. Unlike many other studies that 
address hunting from a normative perspective (Section 1.1), we are interested in the empirical 
diversity of moral arguments, exploring the discourse of a wide range of people, including 
both hunters and non-hunters.  
Three concepts form the backbone of our analysis: morality, legitimacy and discourse. We 
refer here to moral views as evaluations of hunting that present a certain activity as right or 
just – or as wrong and unjust. Strictly speaking, we investigate implicit ethics, i.e., theoretical 
aspects or conscious reflections of morality (Smith 2000 p. 10), as expressed in people’s 
conversations about hunting. However, the boundaries between such implicit ethics and 
enacted morality, i.e., “what people actually believe and do, or the rules they follow” (ibid.) 
are fluid. 
We analyse how moral views are used to legitimise (or delegitimise) hunting in general or 
specific types of hunting in particular. Legitimacy can be understood as the perception that 
something (an act, person or institution) is “in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, 
practices, and procedures accepted by a group” (Zelditch 2001 p. 33) – and legitimation, as a 
process, helps to stabilise social structures, while delegitimation can serve to challenge and 
destabilise such structures (Zelditch 2001). The concept of legitimacy is thus closely related 
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to morality in that it refers to what is seen as ‘right’, but unlike morality, can help to explain 
social processes of conflict and consensus building. 
We interpret moral views and (de)legitimations brought forward in talk here as parts of 
discourses over hunting. Discourses, i.e., shared “ensembles of ideas, concepts and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena” (Hajer 2006 p. 67), often 
have very strong moral components that reflect ideas of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Surprisingly, 
however, such normative components are usually not explicitly considered in discourse 
analyses (Doulton and Brown 2009; see e.g., Dryzek’s 2005 analysis of environmental 
discourses). By contrast, we focus here on the normative elements of discourses over hunting.  
In addition, we argue that these normative components should not be treated as isolated 
arguments, but explored against the backdrop of wider discourses on human-nature 
interactions. Like Haste and Abrahams (2008 p. 381), we examine “how moral accounts are 
constructed, normalised and drawn upon in discourse” and at the same time, how these moral 
accounts fit into their culturally embedded discursive contexts. We thus consider normative 
notions as both contributing to and influenced by discourses.  
Here, we apply these concepts to provide insights into the ways how moral arguments work 
as part of discourses. To do so, we take a grounded approach, analysing talk (here: interviews 
and group discussions) about hunting from sites across six countries, each with their own 
cultural and ecological peculiarities. However, we do not attempt a comparative analysis, as 
strict comparisons would not be meaningful, given the qualitative and grounded approach we 
chose.  
 
2 Methods 
2.1 Study sites and sampling 
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We conducted focus group discussions and in-depth interviews in four European and two 
eastern African countries. Within each of these countries, we selected study sites that together 
cover a wide variety of ecological and social contexts in which hunting takes place (Table 1), 
ranging from agro-pastoralism at the margin of the market economy in Tanzania and Ethiopia 
(see Lowassa et al. in press), trophy hunting in both Europe and Africa, hunting clubs in 
Croatia to sporting estates in Scotland or Spain (Arroyo et al. 2012, Díaz-Fernández et al. 
2102).  
In each of the study areas, we targeted three broad groups: (i) people who hunted, aiming to 
include hunters with a variety of interests and backgrounds, (ii) people who did not hunt and 
(iii) organised hunting critics who engaged in animal welfare, animal rights or anti-poaching 
activities. Focus group discussions often made use of existing groups, such as hunting 
associations, sports clubs, animal welfare groups or village committees, and were 
complemented by a targeted selection of participants we expected to hold specific or different 
views. Overall, our sampling thus aimed for diversity (i.e., theoretical sampling; Glaser and 
Strauss 1967), rather than for a statistically representative reflection of different groups in our 
study countries. Where we refer to groups or places in our presentation of the results, we thus 
do not imply comparison between countries, study sites or hunters and non-hunters. Rather, 
we use these qualifiers to portray discourses over hunting in an as differentiated and 
contextualised manner as possible.  
 
2.2 Data collection 
Our interviews and focus group discussions followed a jointly developed guideline that was 
pre-tested, discussed and refined in several iterations. The order of most questions was 
flexible and depended on the flow of the conversations, but in general, interviews and group 
discussions both started with a broad question about the participants’ views on and 
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relationship with the local area, land management and land use. We then focused the 
conversations on hunting. Where participants hunted themselves, we first probed their own 
experiences, preferences and histories, and then went on to learn about their views on other 
people’s hunting activities. If participants did not hunt, we explored their views on hunting, 
particularly in the study area. The last part of the conversations was usually dedicated to the 
participants’ views on wildlife management.  
We aimed to establish an open atmosphere in our conversations which allowed participants to 
express what they might see as minority views. This was of particular relevance in eastern 
Africa, where hunting by local residents without permits is widespread, but illegal (see 
Lowassa et al. in press).  
After a joint training session in the Tanzanian study sites in February 2010, the bulk of the 
data collection took place in 2010 and was finalised in 2011. All conversations were audio-
recorded and transcribed verbatim, usually in the national language, except in Tanzania and 
Ethiopia where transcriptions were translated into English to facilitate joint analysis.   
 
2.3 Data analysis 
We analysed our data in an iterative and grounded approach. In a first step, each of the 
country teams explored their data and identified main themes and topics. On the basis of 
these, discussed at a workshop in November 2010, we developed a joint and relatively broad 
coding framework. Here, we mainly draw on data from one large coding category that 
captured evaluations of hunting. In a third step, we then identified the main types of moral 
arguments within this category in an iterative fashion. Finally, we systematically analysed all 
text in this coding category according to this typology of arguments. Only then did we relate 
our findings to portrayals of environmental discourses in the literature, and to Brown’s 
(2007a) axes of moral geographies (Section 1.2).  
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3 Overview: Moral arguments on hunting 
Talking about hunting often seemed to imply talking about a moral issue. This was 
particularly pertinent in our European cases, but also among conservation actors in eastern 
Africa: Many of our participants talked, prompted or not, about their views on the legitimacy 
of some types of hunting, and the illegitimacy of others. Few referred to hunting at large: 
I think that any kind of hunting should be absolutely prohibited, I’m sorry for those who 
are in this line of business, but this thing of killing lives, I think that is not right. What’s 
the problem? I think humans believe they are superior, they are the masters of everything 
and they see a rabbit, they don’t mind, they think a rabbit or a deer, that’s nothing. ES-
NH-2-M-30
1
 
More often, however, participants distinguished in their moral assessments between different 
kinds of hunting: 
Killing something for food seems reasonable. Killing something for population control 
seems reasonable. Killing something for fun just doesn't seem right to me. SCO-NH-14-
M-40 
Such more differentiated judgements typically drew on one of four main types of arguments: 
(i) arguments that distinguished between types of hunting based on the species hunted, (ii) 
arguments that referred to the techniques and approaches used for hunting, (iii) arguments 
related to the motives and purposes of hunting or (iv) arguments that relied on distinctions 
between different types of hunters, often opposing rich incomers or outsiders to local hunters.   
                                                          
1
 Sources of quotes are labelled as follows: country code – hunter (H), non-hunter (NH), member of animal 
welfare/ rights organisation (AW) or conservation organisation (CO) – identifier of discussion/interview in 
country – gender – approximate age. For country codes see Table 1. F: female; M: male. 
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In the remainder of this article, we focus on those arguments that referred to the motives and 
purposes of hunting, as these arguments provided most insight into the moralities of hunting 
and were strongly drawn on across all our study sites.  
 
4 Motives as moral arguments: (De)legitimations of hunting 
Overall, arguments that referred to the motives for hunting appeared to be the most important 
for our participants when discussing the legitimacy of hunting. We understand ‘motives’ here 
as the reasons, purposes or objectives of hunting as seen by the respective speaker. Eight 
clusters of motives emerged from our data (Fig. 1), ranging from motives with a tangible 
material basis, such as the provision of food, to more immaterial purposes, such as the 
preservation of cultural heritage.  
 
4.1 Hunting for food 
Generally, across all study sites, two major arguments prevailed. First, participants across all 
groups and countries maintained that where hunting was conducted out of a genuine need for 
food, it was legitimate. Second, it was frequently argued that for whatever other reason 
hunting was conducted, it was only acceptable if the meat was eaten – except where pest 
species, such as “ground vermin”, were hunted that were seen as inedible. For some, for 
example in Croatia and Spain, the combination of these two maxims resulted in the 
argumentation that in contemporary Europe, obtaining food should not be the main reason for 
hunting anymore, but that if hunting was conducted, the meat should be eaten. Several 
hunters drew on such rationale to explain why they, as a consequence, would not hunt 
animals that could not be consumed – as, for example, this gamekeeper who explained why 
he refused a farmer’s request to shoot the roe deer that were feeding on his winter turnips: 
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I said none of these deer, they have got no meat and are in no condition to be going 
on anybody's table.  I would just be killing them and putting them somewhere to… I 
mean I can’t bury them; I’m not going to dig a hole for seven deer, so what’d you do 
with them?  So I said no. SCO-H-9-M-60  
At the same time, there also was a strong view among hunters and some non-hunters and 
hunting critics, that game meat was tasty, ‘good’ and ‘green’ and thus to be preferred over 
meat from domestic livestock. For some, hunting “for the pot” – even where food could be 
easily bought in a supermarket – was thus an important reason that legitimised hunting. 
Well, personally, hunting for subsistence, I think, is ok, isn’t it? You live in the 
countryside, you kill a deer and you eat it, I think that is very good. And even in a, 
say, ‘green’ economy, let’s say, in societies that are already ‘fattened’, well, it could 
be an activity, if it was balanced, that would be necessary, hunting wild species to 
supplement the diet. Sports hunting, in contrast, I don’t like. ES-CO-6-45 
The argumentation among our Ethiopian and Tanzanian participants was largely similar, but 
definitions of what was ‘necessary’ diverged. Whereas some rural residents in Ethiopia 
maintained that hunting was only allowed “in times of hunger”, Tanzanian participants did 
not distinguish between hunting for food and to increase household income; in practice, both 
motives were undistinguishable as a hunter could keep a part of his dried meat for his own 
family, while he might sell another part on. And while, for example, owners of hunting 
companies in Ethiopia felt that local residents’ (illegal) “hunting for the stomach” was 
acceptable, others warned that compared to trophy hunting which focused only on male 
individuals, hunting for food was indiscriminate and could nowadays not be considered 
viable anymore, given the increasing human population.  
 
4.2 Hunting for income: Rural livelihoods versus commercialised hunting 
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Strong arguments were also brought forward in relation to the income-generating function of 
hunting. Generally, hunting that supported rural livelihoods was seen as legitimate, whereas 
‘commercial’ hunting was usually contested. Such argumentation was offered by hunters, 
non-hunters and hunting critics from all study areas. In many places, it was argued that 
hunting contributed substantially to rural economies, which ultimately benefited the “whole 
community” (CRO-H-3-M-42). 
However, where hunting was seen to provide benefits beyond the necessary, it was widely 
regarded as unacceptable. This was a fine line which was not always explicitly discussed, but 
often, the label ‘commercial’ was used in a derogatory sense. ‘Commercial’ then seemed to 
imply that benefits were either not accruing locally (for example, in Tanzania, where not 
local hunters but well-off middlemen would reap the revenue from illegal bushmeat trade), or 
that the hunting was excessive and to the benefit of individuals, beyond their basic needs. For 
example, a gamekeeper criticised commercial pheasant shoots, as he felt the high number of 
birds shot did not allow the hunter to experience the shoot in an appropriate fashion: 
I hate to see big shoots, big commercial shoots. […] if you shoot more than like 15 
birds for your day you don’t remember half of them.  I mean, I was on a big shoot one 
day and shot 100 and… well I wasn't counting the shoot that day but it doesn't matter, 
there were 190 birds shot, right, and I think I hit like 11 for my day and I remembered 
every bird. But talking to some of the guys later on they didn’t even remember half the 
birds they shot yes. […] Well, he had maybe shot 30 birds so he didn't remember. […] 
but a lot of the guys, say, they are kind of, well I suppose oil-related or ken, they are 
just rich people, some of them, and because they have got that kind of money they can 
just go and buy what they want you see, but kind of like what I am doing is more 
rewarding. SCO-H-11-M-50 
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Even where the term ‘commercial’ was used in a merely descriptive sense and simply 
denoted the generation of money, commercial hunting was often criticised, for example, 
because a prioritisation of hunting for business was seen to compromise other notions of 
hunting that were considered as more important, such as stewardship. In addition, as implied 
in the quote from Scotland (above), commercial hunting was seen to attract rich outsiders 
who were often seen to lack the necessary skills, and who distorted the market so that less 
well-off local hunters were excluded. Such argumentation was thus not necessarily always 
directed at commercial hunting per se, but referred to its negative implications in relation to 
potentially conflicting motives, hunting techniques, or the people involved in hunting.  
H6: Yes, but then it is a totally different culture, it is a corporate culture, you might 
say – as I see it. Then it is a job. The hunting culture disappears. […] 
H7: If hunting is shifting in that direction, I am out. NO-H-1-M-48 
 
4.3 Trophy hunting 
In many ways, trophy hunting was conceptually related to hunting for commercial reasons: 
The idea of ‘commercial hunting’ was obviously broader, encompassing not only the sale of 
the opportunity to hunt trophy game, but also small game (such as pheasant, partridges and 
grouse), and hunting for the sale of the meat or other animal products. Among hunters, non-
hunters and hunting critics alike, hunting for trophies was often seen as an unacceptable 
reason if it was the only or main one.  
 Because people who are primarily interested in the trophy, they haven't understood, 
they haven’t got a clue what it is about. […] I usually have many good people coming 
here, and the people…  I like if they come here expecting nothing but really expecting 
just a good time out in the scenery, and they say “oh well, I don't mind, you decide of 
14 
 
course if you have to take out certain deer but I am not a trophy hunter” and I know 
we will have a great week. SCO-H-8-M-55 
While many hunters thus portrayed trophy hunting as a great opportunity to enjoy nature – or 
to foster wildlife conservation – they also maintained that standards of good marksmanship 
should be observed to make this type of hunting acceptable. The use of helicopters or the 
hunt of essentially tame animals, as Norwegian and Scottish hunters purported occurred in 
other countries, was abhorred. Interestingly, also south Ethiopian residents – often themselves 
(illegal) hunters – criticised trophy hunting for using illegal methods, such as torch lights at 
night, leading to the decline of wildlife populations: 
Unlike us, they are the ones who finished all the wild animals here. Because they hunt 
during the night using lights. They kill indiscriminately, from smaller to the bigger 
animals, and they are the ones who make the wildlife migrate to Kenya. ET-H (South 
Omo)-5-M-50 
Some hunters also felt that current trophy hunting practices gave hunters a bad name, and 
thus threatened the legitimacy of hunting in general in the eyes of the wider public: 
We hunters put ourselves in a difficult situation if we go out and show too many 
pornographic pictures, I would almost say, of walls full of grouse. Lying on top of a 
moose and having our picture taken, smiling, old safari style. […] We must be very 
careful with that, and that is because the greens grow stronger and stronger. I mean 
groups that do not see any reason why we should hunt. NO-H-1-M-45 
While several non-hunters shared the hunters’ views, especially in relation to the potential of 
trophy hunting for wildlife conservation, for some organised hunting critics, trophy hunting 
was the essence of illegitimate hunting as it was seen as the combination of two unacceptable 
reasons: hunting for profit and hunting for fun. 
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4.4 Hunting as caring for nature 
A distinct set of reasons for hunting alluded to the hunters’ influence on their natural 
environment. This included hunters’ management of game species, their antagonists (e.g., 
predators) and other animals considered as pests or vermin, and the overall ecosystem. Such 
management activities would mainly consist in the culling of those species that were seen to 
be overabundant for a given land use (e.g., the control of large herbivores to allow forestry), 
but especially in Croatia, management also included feeding of game and vaccinations.  
A hunter is...  a hunter is a higher level of somebody who loves nature. Somebody who 
truly enjoys nature and loves this. […] But not the type of hunter who only thinks 
about his rifle […] and shooting – there are so many other things that constitute a 
hunter. […] This begins with supplementary feeding, observing, maintaining trails, 
watering holes, and salt feeding sites; there are so many things here […] – all those 
shooting stands, observation posts, hunters make all those things and then take care 
of [animals], although not only in that strict sense, but even regarding diseases. 
Listen, regarding rabies – among foxes – only hunters do the, let’s say, dirty job [of 
vaccination] […] – all those things hunters did without any compensation being given 
to them! CRO-H-9-M-54 
Consequently, many hunters across all countries – except the African (illegal) resident 
hunters
2
 – labelled themselves as conservationists or stewards of the land. An extension of 
this argument was that without hunting, certain species and habitats of conservation or iconic 
importance would not exist anymore (e.g., in Spain, Croatia and Scotland), or that the land 
now used for hunting and thus kept natural would be converted to agricultural use (Ethiopia).  
                                                          
2
 Interestingly, residents of the Bale mountains (Ethiopia) did consider themselves as stewards of wildlife, and 
felt that hunting outfitters who organised trophy hunting in their area did not sufficiently appreciate this.   
16 
 
Hunting was thus presented as an essential instrument of nature conservation and, hence, as a 
legitimate and important reason for hunting – and this was also shared by some non-hunters 
and hunting critics: 
In principle I agree with hunting, not so much the sport hunting for antlers counting 
or what have you, but definitely I think there’s a huge problem with the deer and pest 
species and they should be completely culled back to stop other environmental 
damage. SCO-NH-14-M-20 
You know, it used to be the animals themselves who [kept the balance]. The weak ones 
were taken and that was that. Now there are hardly any predators left and then the 
animals suffer. An animal with, for instance, a bad hip will keep walking around, 
suffering, because it is not killed by a predator. But luckily a hunter may come and 
see the sick animal and put it out of its misery. NO-AW-12-W-60 
Some, like the Croatian hunter quoted above, felt that their contribution was not recognised 
by the wider public. But while many non-hunters and also some hunting critics did appreciate 
the role of hunters in ecosystem management, they tended to be more critical, particularly 
where illegal and unselective methods like snares or poison were used and caused 
unnecessary animal suffering. For hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics alike, the key 
issue was here the role that hunters ought to play in nature – a system that humans had 
already interfered with anyway.  
We have been doing it for such a long time that I don’t think nature will be able to 
achieve a balance on its own. Definitely not. NO-H-2-M-48 
While some thus saw it as human responsibility to maintain the balance in an ecosystem, 
others, among them also hunters, cautioned that game managers should not “act like God” 
(SCO-H-8-M-55), and that culling large numbers of deer just to allow reforestation was, 
essentially, “assassination” (SCO-H-1-M-65). The exact definition of good stewardship was 
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thus much debated. However, hunters’ views across many countries coincided that the 
essence of hunting was stewardship and taking care of nature.  
 
4.5 Hunting for recreation 
A further cluster of motives concerned hunting for recreational purposes. This included 
motives such as wanting to be in nature, learn about nature, developing one’s skills, enjoying 
the challenge or thrill (of pursuing an animal and of the kill itself), or socialising, and was 
exclusively discussed among the European hunters. Overall, most arguments that alluded to 
recreation were seen to be acceptable, at best, as a secondary motive. The idea of hunting for 
“fun”, “pleasure” or “excitement” – which usually meant a mix of recreational motives that 
included the thrill of the chase and the actual kill – was most controversial. Many hunting 
critics and non-hunters argued that hunting (and especially killing) for fun could never be 
legitimate: 
I’ll be honest: I think playing tennis is a hobby, football is a hobby, playing with your 
playstation, but not hunting. For me, hunting is almost a crime. ES-NH-2-F-25 
Hunting to socialise – and this often included a meal, sharing game meat – was widely seen 
as an important reason for hunting, at least in European contexts:  
H2: My son lives just over the ridge there. And they gather there a lot. […] So they 
are a really tight group. But just look at those who sit inside staring at their 
computers! If they go out, it is Saturday or Sunday, and they go to a pizza bar or 
something like that. That is not very social! 
H1: I can give you an example, from the first day they were tracking lynx [this 
season]. My son came along, and he brought another one, and also a landowner who 
owns the forest up there […]. And then yet another one came along, a guy who had 
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been tracking from the other side. And all these people came [to our home] and my 
wife made a pile of waffles for them, for the whole gang. So that was a social thing.  
F: Yes, I see. 
H1: So that runs very deep. 
H2: Yes, it does, it certainly does. And that is a good thing! NO-H-3-M-72 
In the Spanish case, however, socialising was not viewed as a legitimate motive for hunting 
where its main aim was business networking and thus not directly related to hunting as such.  
Others suggested that hunting might be enjoyable but that this ought not to be a motivation, 
or at least not the sole or primary one. Many hunters subscribed to this latter view, and 
pointed out that they might hunt largely for recreational reasons, but that to them, the killing 
of animals was the least important element of the hunt: 
But I never go in the woods, let’s say, the rifle is with me – [I don’t go] with an 
intention, plan to bring back something in my backpack – the main purpose somehow 
is to relax […], observe nature, to enjoy the peace, silence, and each and every 
hunter, whoever is a hunter – in hunting there is always something new, something 
that has not been experienced so far. […] Being a hunter is not about shooting just 
some large carnivores: The hunter enters into the soul of everything that surrounds 
him. CRO-H-9-M-54 
Implicit in this argumentation was sometimes the notion that hunting, by virtue of the 
intimate relationship with wildlife it allowed, was a way to obtain better knowledge on nature 
than non-hunters could ever achieve: 
I think a hunter, compared to others who don’t hunt, is more interested in animals. 
Hunters are most interested in the animals they hunt themselves. But they know a lot 
about other things as well, even if they have specialised knowledge about [those 
animals] that they are most interested in. NO-H-4-W-42 
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The excitement that the actual killing could provide was thus presented very differently by 
different hunters. While some described how hunting success made them proud – of their 
own skills, or the performance of their dogs – others said that hunting gave them a thrill, but 
toned this statement down by adding that the actual kill was not necessary to feel this thrill, 
but that it largely resulted from becoming “one with nature and with the quarry you hunt” 
(SCO-H-8-M-55). Several non-hunters could understand this sentiment, but felt that to make 
such hunting legitimate, the animal had to have a fair chance of escaping, or argued that 
while they appreciated that hunting was done for recreational reasons, the suffering of the 
animals was too high a price to pay, given that other activities might offer similar recreational 
effects: 
I have this good friend that is a keen hunter, especially large game, and he talks about 
the adrenaline of waiting for the deer, of shooting... and I say “mate, go bungee 
jumping”. ES-NH-2-M-30  
 
4.6 Hunting for cultural reasons 
Another common group of moral statements argued that hunting was legitimate where it 
fostered the cultural heritage of a place or a family lineage. In southern Ethiopia, hunting was 
so integral to local traditions that, for men, not hunting was seen as negative, and the current 
youth was criticised for losing the skills necessary for the hunt. Elsewhere, both hunters and 
non-hunters drew on similar, but less generalised, arguments: 
I think the other thing which is really important to remember is that the vast majority 
of the people that are working the estates are not doing it for the money. They do it 
because it is a way of life, and it is part of their culture and heritage, and you know, 
we are being pushed all the time by [the governmental conservation agency]. When or 
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if the sporting interest deteriorates or starts to fade away in parts of Scotland, part of 
our heritage will be lost. SCO-H-3-M-35 
For some, the need to maintain this heritage even called for legislation that protected hunting 
as a threatened practice of a cultural minority: 
People in other parts of the world have indigenous rights, I mean like the Inuit and 
the Aborigines, and although there is no such thing as an indigenous people in 
western…, well there are in northern Scandinavia, but not here, but I sort of feel the 
same thing should apply, it is part of our way of life. […] The opportunities that we 
have get seen to be endlessly diminished and legislated against, and we do feel, and 
we have the conversation a lot between us and various friends of ours, that we just 
feel more and more under siege, under scrutiny almost. SCO-H-2-M-45 
This speaker thus actively used the term ‘indigenous’ to legitimise hunting in Scotland. In 
eastern Africa, some conservationists drew on similar ideas of ‘cultural’ hunting, contrasting 
traditional hunting techniques with spears or bow and arrow (deemed as legitimate) with the 
(illegitimate) modern use of snares or even automatic rifles. For European contexts, this sort 
of reasoning was disputed by some non-hunters and hunting critics, who felt that the fact that 
an activity could be considered as cultural heritage did not necessarily mean that it should not 
be abandoned.  
However, hunting for cultural reasons that were seen as not genuine or as “showing off” was 
generally seen as unacceptable by hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics. Recurrently, and 
across all European sites, participants gave examples of ‘pretend-hunters’ whose alleged 
main aim was to show off their gear, vehicle, firearms, or wealth in general. Such motives for 
hunting were heavily criticised.  
 
4.7 Hunting as part of human nature 
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By comparison, hunting was relatively rarely portrayed as a part of human nature.  
Something in us, in our genetic code because we used to be hunters… for a long, long 
time… And then we stopped being hunters, but it stayed in us; in some more, in some 
less. CRO-H-5-M-53 
While none of our participants explicitly used this argument as an overt legitimation for 
hunting, where it was used by hunters, it was usually set in a positive context, implicitly 
creating an image of hunting as naturally human. By contrast, participants from animal rights 
groups flatly dismissed this notion, providing elaborate arguments why such legitimations did 
not hold: 
I used to hunt and fish myself [in my youth], so I know that excitement. OK, call it an 
instinct, the drive to capture your prey. But that “instinct” has also led to a lot of 
excitement [without hurting animals], because I have the same intense feeling as a 
nature photographer, when I am close to capturing the perfect image. When I have 
been lying still for hours, waiting for a bird to appear, exactly where I expected it. I 
don’t think that instinct or whatever you call it is unique to hunting and fishing. And 
even if it was, I don’t think following that instinct can justify an activity that is 
ethically questionable. Humans have many strange instincts, and some of those have 
horrendous consequences if we live them out. So I don’t think that can be an 
argument for hunting. It might help to explain why people hunt, but it can never 
justify hunting. NO-AW-15-M-35 
 
5 Motives of hunting: Discursive patterns 
While the different groups in our different study sites diverged in the detail of their 
argumentation, we could discern discursive patterns that were used across countries and 
backgrounds.  
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One core element of our participants’ talk about hunting was that motives were frequently 
played out against each other, usually spontaneously and unprompted by our questions. 
Hunting motives were not only compared across categories (e.g., the legitimacy of hunting 
for food compared to hunting for recreation), but also within these categories. Strikingly, 
there seemed to be an underlying spectrum within each cluster of motives (Fig. 2), and most 
motives could be interpreted as both legitimate and illegitimate, depending on what side of 
the spectrum a specific case was seen to be on. For example, hunting to earn a livelihood was 
usually seen as acceptable if the beneficiaries were known and seen as underprivileged or in 
need – and such argumentation could apply to both European and African countries. 
However, where hunting was considered as excessive, ‘commercialised’, benefiting well-off 
and greedy businesspeople or landowners, it was illegitimate. Similarly, where hunting was 
seen as considerate, care-taking stewardship, it could be legitimised – by contrast, if hunters 
were perceived to force themselves on nature, it was unacceptable. Overall it seemed that all 
these gradients were underpinned by notions of the moderate, considerate and controlled as 
the acceptable end of the spectrum, and the excessive, uncontrolled on the other end (Table 
2). Such gradients were sometimes even explicitly expressed by our participants:  
It is awful. It is horrible. I know, my neighbour – I will not mention his name or what 
but – he catches, he brags about catching a few hundreds of dormice in one season 
and... [… there is a difference] if somebody catches 5 or 10 dormice for food because 
it is tasty and if somebody catches 200, 300, 400 and makes ointment and freezes 
that... CRO-NH-18-F-29 
And while our participants might have diverged in their attributions of such motives to 
specific cases of hunting, the underlying values seemed to concur: All participants appeared 
to agree that if a motive was excessive, it could never be acceptable, whereas the same 
motive in moderation could form a legitimate reason for hunting. In addition, the gradients 
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underpinning these moral arguments often (but not always) seemed to follow a continuum 
from the self-centred to the societal. Hunting for motives that solely considered the benefit of 
the individual (e.g., for the thrill, financial revenue, showing off, dominating nature) appeared 
to be regarded as less legitimate than hunting for reasons that took community or wider 
societal benefits into account.  
A second striking discursive feature was the role of an implicit hierarchy of motives. 
Repeatedly, participants argued that a certain motive ought not to be the primary reason for 
hunting, but that it might be acceptable as a secondary motive. Motives that were typically 
considered as ‘subordinate’ included hunting for trophies (in all European sites) and 
recreation, particularly with regard to hunting for fun or to socialise: 
I think providing the meat must be most important. You need a good reason. You can’t 
just go around shooting all that moves; it has to be about providing food. And then 
there is the need to manage the stock, but I don’t think hunting is primarily about 
experiencing nature, because then… well, of course it is that also, but if you need a 
gun and a dog to get out in the forest, I think that sounds stupid. If you just want to 
get out you can buy a poodle and a walking stick. NO-H-7-M-45 
Often, however, none of the motives was clearly pronounced as a legitimate ‘primary’ reason 
– rather, the acceptability of certain motives as a primary reason emerged by inverse 
inference. The ‘necessary condition’ for hunting thus often remained unclear – despite the 
important role that such implicit hierarchies of motivations played in the argumentation. In a 
continuation of this argumentation, the positive effects for the hunters personally, such as 
recreation, were sometimes implicitly portrayed as a well-earned reward for their 
contributions to the greater good, such as wildlife stewardship. This way, the combination 
with morally ‘superior’ motives legitimated hunting for morally ‘inferior’ ones, and, in a win-
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win situation, created favourable outcomes for the individual hunter, nature and society at 
large. 
In addition, it seemed that some cases could be exempt from moral considerations of 
legitimacy altogether: Where people were not seen to have a choice other than to hunt in 
order to survive, no further examinations of their hunting activities were attempted: “We tend 
not to want to impose our values on cultures and societies that don’t have the choices that 
are available in the West” (SCO-AW-17-W-50). Hunters’ agency was thus a precondition for 
moral evaluations of hunting.  
Several motives were seen – also by many hunters – as particularly problematic, among them 
commercial and trophy hunting (Sections 4.2, 4.3), and hunting for fun and excitement 
(Section 4.5). However, our sample also included hunters who practiced hunting for such 
reasons.  How did these hunters portray and evaluate their own activities? Again, it seemed 
that there was a repertoire of discursive patterns. These included, first, the argumentation that 
they did conduct hunting for a certain reason (e.g., for trophies, fun or business) but that this 
was, in fact, not their main motive. Instead, their hunting was really about nature 
conservation, or a close connection to nature. Here, as in many other instances (see above), 
the order of motives was used to legitimise hunting. Second, in a variation of this pattern, 
some trophy hunters argued that their hunting activities prevented land uses that were even 
less desirable (such as uncontrolled poaching by local residents, or agriculture), and thus 
legitimate and, in fact, beneficial. Third, it was argued that also hunting for trophies, business 
or fun could be acceptable if certain standards were observed, for example, concerning 
animal welfare and ‘fair chase’. Fourth, some hunters downplayed the moral relevance of 
their trophy or commercial hunting activities: They maintained that their trophy hunting was 
only a very small part of their hunting overall, or if they were running activities that could be 
called commercial, that these hunts were actually not very lucrative and the income generated 
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was just sufficient to cover the costs. Such discursive patterns were employed very 
frequently, and it seemed as if hunters were aware of or anticipated critique by others, even 
though these others were not present at the time of the interview.  
 
6 The moralities of hunting in the context of global environmental management 
discourses 
Many of the moral arguments raised in our conversations over hunting bore striking 
resemblance with argumentations elsewhere. Here, we explore relationships between the 
normative building bricks of hunting discourses identified in our data and broader discourses 
on environmental management (Arts et al. 2012). Rather than providing an exhaustive 
analysis of such relationships, we aim here to point out some prominent links. 
Among the multitude of recent studies on discourses of environmental management (e.g., 
Dryzek 2005), the analyses by Adger et al. (2001) and Svarstad et al. (2008) are potentially 
most useful to contextualise our findings. Both analyses concur in that they identify (a) a 
managerial type of discourse, expressing a faith in science and institutional solutions, in 
particular, in “win-win” approaches that are beneficial both economically and ecologically 
and (b) a populist type of counter-discourse that defends the rights of local people, and fends 
off interventions by external ‘managerial’ actors. 
In our data, the win-win rationale of modern conservation (Svarstad et al. 2008) seemed to be 
reflected in the argument that hunting could provide a range of benefits at the same time, for 
the individual hunter as well as for society, and in conservation as well as in economic terms. 
This was particularly striking where (trophy) hunting was explicitly seen as good as, through 
its contribution to the economy, it ‘put a value on wildlife’, and thus kept habitat destruction 
and uncontrolled illegal hunting at bay:  
26 
 
E: Basically I support sport hunting. […] its main objective is sustaining the wildlife 
by the income generated from the wildlife. […] 
F: Basically, legal hunting, apart from its economic benefits, I believe is an approach 
that can help the survival of the wildlife. Because if they had not been kept as wildlife 
conservation areas with a lot of effort, these areas would have by now been used for 
agricultural purposes. ET-CO(Government)-4-M/M-30/55 
On the other hand, the populist (Adger et al. 2001) discourse appeared to resonate in the 
argumentation of many hunters in Europe. Often, their position seemed to be defensive, 
portraying the legitimacy of their hunting as challenged by the moral views of the wider 
public, including actors at the international and national level. In Norway, the anti-hunting 
argument was seen to come from animal welfare organisations, whereas in Scotland, the anti-
hunting sentiment was regarded to pertain to institutionalised conservation (see quotes in 
Section 4.6), supported by the increasingly urbanised moral views of the general public. As a 
response to the perceived attack on their rights to hunt, hunters all across our European study 
sites seemed to emphasise moral arguments and legitimacy considerations in their 
conversations with us, even without prompting. Motives such as stewardship, the attainment 
of intimate knowledge of nature and the continuation of cultural heritage were brought 
forward to create an image of hunters as the people on the ground, with a culture based on 
resource use and physical interaction with nature that was under threat from an expanding 
new culture disconnected from their natural environment. In this context, terms such as 
‘community’ and ‘cultural’ were repeatedly used by those who considered themselves as 
community members to denote something valuable that demanded protection. Such 
argumentation thus aligned itself with other populist and traditionalist discourses elsewhere 
in the world that emphasise the importance of indigenous knowledge and rights (Adger et al. 
2001).  
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7 Discussion 
7.1 The morality and legitimacy of hunting 
Our conversations with hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics in six countries showed that 
the morality of hunting was not only an issue debated in philosophical essays (Section 1.1) 
but very much so also in everyday talk about hunting. While moral arguments often related to 
motives for hunting (Section 4), they could also refer to hunting techniques, species hunted, 
and to a lesser degree, questions on the identity of the hunter (Section 3). And although we 
certainly found a huge diversity and complexity in the argumentation, striking patterns could 
be discerned (Section 5). Some of the moral arguments used in our conversations on hunting 
reflected wider discourses on land use (Section 6). Our findings thus imply that debates over 
hunting are not isolated, but embedded in more general negotiations of the ‘right’ way of 
managing the land or engaging with nature.  
Our analysis suggests that moral views on hunting had two main discursive functions. First, 
they were directly used to legitimise or delegitimise specific hunting activities, inferring 
legitimacy from the moral goodness of, for example, a certain motive for hunting. Second, 
and connected to this, moral views were also used as moral imperatives, stipulating ethical 
requirements for hunting to be legitimate. For example, many of our participants expressed 
the imperative that game meat should be eaten and not discarded, in order for hunting to be 
morally acceptable. By meeting such imperatives, hunting conducted for motives that were 
widely seen as morally inferior (Section 5), such as recreation, also became legitimate. 
The importance of moral considerations for our participants seemed to reflect a pervasive 
demand for moral responsibility expressed by hunters, non-hunters and hunting critics alike. 
While it might be futile to gauge if this demand was more strongly expressed in relation to 
hunting than other land uses (Setten 2004, Brown 2007b), there might be several reasons why 
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in the context of hunting, morality and legitimacy were particularly pertinent issues – 
especially for our European participants and those representing conservation organisations in 
eastern Africa. First, hunting generally implies the taking of animals’ lives, and, at least in 
Western contexts and at first sight, tends to necessitate more legitimation than, for example, 
small-scale crop cultivation. Second, as we argued in Section 6, hunters in many places saw 
themselves in a defensive position, having to legitimise their activities, a phenomenon that 
Bergman (2005) also reports from the United States. Interestingly, where local residents of 
the Ethiopian and Tanzanian countryside had been exposed to conservation awareness 
campaigns, they appeared to draw more heavily on legitimacy arguments (e.g., suggesting 
that illegal hunting helped them to pay their children’s school fees) than those who had been 
influenced by such campaigns to a lesser degree.  
In our data, moral arguments were thus used through discourse to legitimise, i.e., stabilise, or 
delegitimise, i.e., destabilise hunting practices. Such processes of discursive (de)legitimation 
can be considered as a “mechanism that mediates between the structure of groups and the 
action of the individual, on the one hand, and between the actions of the individuals and 
structure of groups on the other” (Zelditch 2001 p. 50/51). References to broader discourses 
beyond hunting, for example, to a win-win logic or indigenous rights, reinforced credibility 
as these increased the likelihood that the audience understood and subscribed to the 
arguments and thus accepted the hunting practice in question as legitimate.  
Theories of legitimacy have been classified as belonging to (a) a “consensus” approach that 
posits that legitimacy arises from shared values and beliefs, or (b) a “conflict” approach that 
assumes that, as the real interests of people diverge, there is no consensus, and those in power 
need to make those that are not believe that they share the same values and beliefs, in order to 
obtain legitimacy (Zelditch 2001). In concrete terms, this results in the question whether 
discursive legitimations are genuine expressions of the speaker’s beliefs and values, or if they 
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are put forward mainly for strategic reasons. Interestingly, this distinction can often be found 
implicitly in the literature (e.g., Jost and Major 2001), but is hardly ever theorised. For 
example, Woods (1997) suggests that hunters might refer to societal functions of hunting 
(such as wildlife management) to actively legitimise hunting, whereas personal objectives 
(such as recreation) might be seen as less legitimate, but ultimately as the real motivation for 
hunting. However, in our data, the distinction between ‘strategic’ and ‘genuine’ was 
empirically difficult to make, and our observations (Section 5) did thus neither support nor 
refute the “conflict” approach to legitimacy. 
 
7.2 Moral geographies – motives of hunting 
We found that study participants referred to similar types of moral views as Brown (2007a, b) 
described in her study on crofting in Scotland (Section 1.2). Practice-based arguments 
referred to the techniques and approaches used for hunting (Section 3), and what Brown 
(2007b) terms ‘objective-based’ corresponded well with our category of ‘motives’. Identity-
based aspects, albeit often mentioned in more general contexts, were not very often raised as 
moral arguments in a strict sense, but could be found in references to rich outsiders whose 
hunting was seen to be less acceptable than that of ‘real’, often local, hunters. Place-based 
arguments (Brown 2007b) were hardly mentioned in our debates about hunting. By contrast, 
characteristics of species appeared an important element in our conversations that portrayed 
the hunting of, for example, abundant species or pests as more legitimate than the hunting of 
rare species (Section 3).  
Overall, our participants gave very high importance to hunters’ motives. This seems 
interesting from an empirical philosophical point of view, as it implied that the morality of 
hunting was predominantly judged by the hunter’s intentions, rather than by the outcome of 
the hunting act. References to the motives of hunting can also be found elsewhere in the 
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literature (e.g., Kellert 1979, Woods 1997, Heberlein and Willebrand 1998, see Section 1.1), 
including in non-normative contexts such as Bennett and Robinson (2000) who differentiate 
between hunting for nutrition, the economy, culture and recreation. However, our analysis 
shows that conceptualisations and moral evaluations of motives that appear homogenous at 
the surface (such as ‘hunting for pleasure’) can include a broad spectrum of notions with very 
different moral implications (such as ‘being close to nature’ as opposed to ‘hunting for the 
thrill of the kill’). This suggests that questionnaire-based surveys that make use of such 
general concepts might miss out on essential differentiations within such categories. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
Not surprisingly, the moral views identified in our data corresponded well to the various 
arguments that can be found in the philosophical literature (Section 1.1). However, our 
approach was distinct from these pieces as it took an empirical perspective on the diversity of 
argumentation, including abstract and generic as well as concrete and contextualised views, 
identifying moral arguments in a systematic (rather than ad-hoc, as in Woods 1997) manner.  
In contrast to studies that focus on a particular type of hunting or elucidate a specific 
argument in great depth, our approach offered a broad, grounded overview and thus allowed 
us to identify larger patterns. In Walzer’s (1994) terminology, our “thick”, i.e., contextualised 
interpretations of moral views provided insights into “minimal moralities”, i.e., the “thin” 
principles common to discourses across places and social groups, and thus “facilitated 
encounter” between argumentations of hunters, non-hunters and organised hunting critics.  
And indeed, our findings suggest that there might be more similarities in the moral views of 
these groups than is commonly thought, at least at the local level, as our conversations with 
animal welfare actors in Norway and previous research with game managers and professional 
conservationists in Scotland (Fischer and Marshall 2010) illustrate. Further, differences in 
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evaluations of hunting practices were often not due to fundamental disagreements on moral 
values, but lay in the question to which degree these were observed in real life. Recurrence to 
common, “minimal moralities” that capture a consensus on what constitutes legitimate 
hunting (and what does not) could be used as a starting point to manage disputes between 
hunters and other actors in wildlife management. 
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Fig. 1: Overview of motives for hunting mentioned by study participants in six countries (see 
Table 1) to either legitimise or delegitimise hunting. Overlapping areas denote conceptual 
similarities as expressed in our data, but size of overlapping areas does not imply degree of 
conceptual similarity. Not all motives were mentioned in all study sites. “Recreation” 
includes enjoyment of the various stages of the hunt, socialising, learning and being in nature. 
“Taking care of nature” includes stewardship, controlling game and non-game species.  
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Fig. 2: Overview of gradients formed by moral arguments on hunting motives, used to (de-) 
legitimise hunting, based on data from all six study areas. Notions shown on the left side 
were usually evaluated as legitimate reasons for hunting, whereas notions shown on the right 
were largely seen as not legitimate.  
LEGITIMATE  ILLEGITIMATE 
Hunting for food 
Genuine subsistence 
 
Where meat could be obtained 
otherwise  hunters as  “butchers” 
Hunting as a livelihood 
Earning needed money in a somehow 
underprivileged place to support rural 
livelihoods, deserving beneficiaries  
“Commercial”, luxury, greed 
Hunting as caring for nature 
Caretaking, stewardship, conservation 
 
Playing god, assassination, 
interference 
Hunting for recreation 
Enjoyment, learning, connection to 
nature  
Solely for excitement, thrill, 
adrenaline release 
Hunting for cultural reasons 
Passing on heritage 
 
Showing off 
Measured, moderate, controlled 
Providing wider benefits to nature and 
society 
 Excessive, uncontrolled Self-centred, focused on the 
individual 
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Table 1: Data collection and composition of the sample 
Country 
(code) 
Study area Participants Thematic focus Number of group dis-
cussions + interviews 
Number of  
participants 
Ethiopia 
(ET) 
South Omo 
Local residents (agro-pastoralists) 
Illegal hunting, 
trophy hunting 
9+5 105 
Bale mountains 3+0 32 
Addis Ababa Professional hunters, governmental 
and non-governmental 
conservationists 
4+0 39 
Tanzania 
(TZ) 
Western Serengeti Local residents (agro-pastoralists: 
hunters and non-hunters) Illegal bushmeat 
hunting 
8+3 79 
Conservation actors (anti-bushmeat 
hunting) 
Norway 
(NO) 
Aurskog-Høland, 
Flå, Oslo, Bærum 
Hunters All types of 
hunting 
8+15 50 
Non-hunters and animal rights 
activists 
4+11 31 
39 
 
Scotland 
(SCO) 
(Lower) Deeside Game managers and hunters Deer stalking, 
gamebird 
shooting, land 
management for 
stalking/ 
shooting 
3+9 
37 
Non-hunters and animal welfare  
actors 
5+0 
Spain 
(ES) 
Castilla-La Mancha Game managers and hunters All types of 
hunting, focus 
on red-legged 
partridge 
3+0 21 
Non-hunters (rural and urban) and 
conservation actors 
3+0 19 
Croatia 
(CRO) 
 
Gorski kotar 
 
 
Local residents (hunters, non-
hunters and non-hunters) 
All types of 
hunting 
5+8 
 
26 
Conservation and animal welfare 
actors  
0+3 3 
 
